The Logic of Deliberate Diversification
Turkmenistan has no real domestic defence industry. Its military-industrial capacity is limited to maintenance, repair, and overhaul of existing equipment, with no indigenous production of heavy weaponry, aerospace platforms, or naval vessels, according to researchers from the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs presenting at Harvard's Davis Center in February 2026. Every step of military modernisation depends on foreign suppliers. According to data from the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Türkiye accounted for roughly 36 percent of Turkmenistan's arms imports during the mid-2010s, with China at 27 percent and Russia at 20 percent. By 2023, the CIA World Factbook listed China, Italy, and Türkiye as the top three, with Russia's share diminished. An Oxus Society analysis of SIPRI transfer data found that Turkmenistan has the most diversified portfolio of arms suppliers in Central Asia.
Each supplier fills a specific niche. Türkiye's Dearsan Shipyard delivered roughly 25 vessels — patrol boats, landing craft, search-and-rescue ships, and a hydrographic vessel — to the Turkmen Navy and Coast Guard between 2010 and 2019, culminating in the Deniz Han, a 1,600-ton guided-missile corvette commissioned at Turkmenbashi Naval Base on 11 August 2021. Ashgabat purchased four M-346FA fighter-attack and two M-346FT trainer aircraft from Italy's Leonardo for €293.1 million, a deal disclosed by the Italian Senate in May 2020. Five Brazilian-built Embraer A-29B Super Tucano light attack aircraft were delivered in 2021 and based at Mary-2 airbase near the Afghan border. From China, Turkmenistan acquired the FD-2000 long-range air defence system — the export variant of the HQ-9 — first publicly fired during exercises broadcast on Turkmen state television in April 2016, alongside medium-range HQ-12 batteries that together form a layered defensive network.
| Supplier | Key platform(s) | Role | Share (mid-2010s) |
| Türkiye | Deniz Han corvette, TB2 drone, Dearsan patrol vessels | Naval platforms, drones, ground vehicles | ~36% |
| China | FD-2000 (HQ-9), HQ-12 | Strategic & medium-range air defence | ~27% |
| Russia | T-72 / T-80, Mi-8/Mi-24 rotary-wing | Armour backbone, rotary-wing aviation | ~20% |
| Italy | Leonardo M-346FA/FT | Jet trainers and light attack | Growing post-2020 |
| Brazil | Embraer A-29B Super Tucano | Afghan border counterinsurgency | Niche delivery 2021 |
Iran's Diminished Shadow
Turkmenistan shares a 1,148-kilometre border with Iran. Tehran's proximity has long shaped Turkmen security infrastructure. Research presented at Harvard's Davis Center in February 2026 found that the M37 highway, Turkmenistan's primary military transport artery, was originally designed during the Soviet period with a defensive focus on Iran, and that most military bases remain clustered along that corridor near the Iranian border rather than near Afghanistan. As recently as January 2026, Ashgabat stepped up security measures in border regions in response to Iranian instability, introducing strict checks on vehicles and citizens and restricting internet access over concerns about potential spillover.
That equation has been dismantled. The June 2025 Twelve-Day War inflicted severe damage on Iran's nuclear and missile infrastructure. Before the subsequent US-Israeli campaign began, Israeli analysts assessed that the June war had already destroyed roughly two-thirds of Iran's ballistic missile launchers and a third to a half of its pre-war missile stockpile. The current campaign has gone far further. Through the war's first five weeks, the White House assessed that the combined campaigns had destroyed more than 85 percent of Iran's defence industrial base, obliterated 150 warships, sunk every Iranian submarine, and grounded the Iranian air force entirely.
For Turkmenistan, this means reduced coercive pressure on its western border. Ashgabat never publicly identified Iran as a threat; to do so would conflict with its neutrality doctrine. But Iran's near-total loss of conventional force-projection capability removes an implicit constraint on Turkmen procurement. Purchasing high-profile Western or Turkic-world systems that might once have drawn quiet displeasure from Tehran now carries negligible risk.
The Turkic Tilt
The most visible trend in Turkmenistan's procurement is the growing share held by Türkiye. Baykar's Bayraktar TB2 combat drones made their public debut at the 27 September 2021 Independence Day parade in Ashgabat, fitted with Roketsan MAM-L and MAM-C munitions and a Hensoldt ARGOS-II forward-looking infrared sensor. Dearsan's relationship with the Turkmen Navy now spans more than a decade. Turkish platforms deliver strong capability at lower price points than Western European or American alternatives, and the cultural dimension is amplified by Turkmenistan's accession as observer to the Organisation of Turkic States in November 2021.
Ankara has built defence-industrial relationships across the Turkic world, and Turkmenistan has been one of the most consequential customers. From 2010 to 2019, Turkmenistan, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan together accounted for roughly 50 percent of Turkish arms exports. With Iran's military shattered and Russia absorbed by its war in Ukraine, the space for Türkiye to deepen its defence footprint in Turkmenistan has widened considerably.
The platforms are NATO-adjacent, the supply chain is interoperable, and the political risk to Washington of Türkiye's primacy in Turkmen procurement is lower than the alternative. The strategic question for Washington is not whether to compete with Ankara but where to complement it.
The American Opening
US defence engagement with Turkmenistan has historically been modest but persistent. Turkmenistan was the first Central Asian state to join NATO's Partnership for Peace programme, in May 1994. A State Partnership Program pairing with the Nevada National Guard ran from 1996 to 2011, and the programme was quietly revived in 2021 under a new pairing with the Montana National Guard, with subsequent exchanges focused on disaster response, cyber defence, and border security. The January 2026 Driscoll visit followed the 6 November 2025 C5+1 Presidential Summit at the White House, where President Berdimuhamedov met with President Donald Trump as part of the first leader-level C5+1 in Washington.
US defence export policy in Central Asia still faces real constraints. Human rights conditionality has historically limited the scale and type of equipment Washington can offer. The opportunity lies not in competing with Türkiye or Italy for frontline combat platforms but in specialised niches: surveillance systems, border monitoring technology, electronic warfare equipment, and intelligence-sharing frameworks that complement Ashgabat's counter-terrorism priorities along its 804-kilometre Afghan border. The 2020 US Strategy for Central Asia identified border security as a priority, citing more than $90 million in US investment across the region in detection, interdiction, and training infrastructure, including 13 operational border posts.
What Comes Next
Turkmenistan's procurement strategy is unlikely to undergo a sharp pivot. Ashgabat's entire defence posture is built on avoiding alignment, and a sudden shift toward any single bloc would undermine the diversification logic that has served it well. More likely is a gradual rebalancing: further increases in Turkish and Western European platforms, a steady Chinese presence in strategic air defence, and a continued decline in Russia's share as Moscow's defence-industrial capacity remains absorbed by wartime needs.
The wildcard is Washington. The Trump administration's campaign against Iran has reshaped the regional security architecture in ways that bear directly on Turkmenistan. With a fragile ceasefire now in place and peace talks set to begin in Islamabad, the United States has demonstrated both the willingness and the capacity to use force in Central Asia's immediate neighbourhood. For Ashgabat, the signal is unmistakable: Washington is an active power nearby, not a distant one. Turkmenistan does not need F-35s. It needs sensor networks along the Afghan and Iranian borders, maritime domain awareness in the Caspian, and communications infrastructure that interoperates with regional partners. These are areas where American firms hold clear advantages and where human rights concerns are less likely to block cooperation.
Turkmenistan's multi-vector procurement strategy is, at its core, a statement about sovereignty. Ashgabat buys from everyone precisely so it owes no one. In a region shaped by great-power competition, that independence has strategic value — not only for Turkmenistan but for any external power, Washington included, that prefers Central Asian capitals to have options.
The Driscoll-Gor visit was the opening gesture, not the policy. Operationalising the engagement requires three concrete commitments: a sustained niche-capabilities programme through DSCA channels focused on sensors, maritime domain awareness, and intelligence sharing; an Ex-Im Bank financing window that can match Turkish concessional terms on dual-use equipment; and a State Partnership Program revival under the Montana National Guard that goes beyond ceremonial exchanges to substantive interoperability work. None of these requires Ashgabat to abandon neutrality. All of them give Washington durable presence in a security environment where the alternative is Turkish or Chinese primacy by default.
The arsenal is built to balance every supplier. The opportunity is to be a supplier worth balancing.
Note: This policy brief was completed on 22 May 2026 and reflects information available as of that date. SIPRI arms transfer data, Oxus Society analysis, and Italian Senate disclosure cited are open-source. References to Iranian military capacity draw on White House and Israeli government assessments. This brief does not constitute legal, investment, or policy advice.
