
Ukraine is fighting three wars simultaneously: an external war against Russian invasion, an internal war against entrenched corruption, and a hybrid war against demographic collapse. This paper argues that the third — the least visible and least discussed — is the most likely to determine whether Ukraine survives as a sovereign state through the second quarter of the twenty-first century.
Ukraine is fighting three wars simultaneously: an external war against Russian invasion, an internal war against entrenched corruption, and a hybrid war against demographic collapse — and this paper argues that the third of these, the least visible and least discussed, is the most likely to determine whether Ukraine survives as a sovereign state through the second quarter of the twenty-first century. Drawing on the distinction between formal sovereignty and substantive independence, and using Belarus as a concrete illustration of how a state can retain the former while losing the latter, the paper traces the mechanisms by which Ukraine's demographic trajectory — a population that has fallen from roughly 52 million at independence to somewhere between 28 and 29 million in government-controlled territory by mid-2026 — threatens the substance, not merely the form, of Ukrainian statehood.
The paper documents three compounding accelerants of that trajectory. Its analytical frame is the war of attrition understood in a broader-than-military sense — the grinding of battlefield casualties extended to the same attritional logic operating on population, institutions, and social cohesion. The external war has exhausted Ukraine's volunteer base, turned increasingly to coercive mobilization, and generated desertion rates that rose from roughly 29 soldiers per day in 2022 to nearly 576 per day in the first half of 2025. Corruption, which predates the war by three decades and reached the presidency itself through the 2025 Energoatom scandal, erodes the institutional trust that both diaspora return and EU accession credibility depend on. And the domestic contest over mobilization, citizenship reform, and labor migration has fused into a single civilizational-identity argument in a society that has undergone one of the fastest processes of national and cultural consolidation in modern European history — making mass immigration from culturally distant countries, the only arithmetic solution to the labor shortage, uniquely incompatible with the society being asked to implement it.
Battlefield scenario modeling for 2026–2030 shows that large-scale Russian territorial conquest remains implausible — a genuine occupation would require several hundred thousand to several million additional troops Russia has shown no capacity or will to mobilize — but that a war continuing at current intensity would cost Ukraine a further one million people or more by 2030, compounding a decline already driven more by fertility collapse and emigration than by battlefield losses. The paper argues the more probable route to Ukrainian sovereignty becoming functionally hollow runs not through military defeat but through two interdependent channels: a Moscow channel, where Russia's patient-attrition strategy exploits Ukraine's internal exhaustion, and a Brussels channel, where the EU's enlargement fatigue, reconstruction-cost concerns, and broad member-state resistance (including France, Germany, Poland, and a Slovak veto) delay the institutional anchor that has reliably protected other declining states from dependency.
This is a comprehensive, heavily-sourced 79-page paper spanning nine chapters — from the demographic trajectory itself, through the external war and corruption as accelerants, to the battlefield-and-demographic scenario modeling and the two roads to dependency. What's below is a summary of its core argument and key findings; we'd encourage you to read the full paper yourself for the complete picture.
The paper's scenario modeling (Chapter 7) runs two tracks through 2030: Track 1 assumes the war ends in 2026, Track 2 assumes it continues. Both draw on UN, World Bank, and Kyiv School of Economics projections alongside the authors' original battlefield-attrition estimates.
"The quota system thus turns coercion into a chain reaction that travels from the highest military necessity down to the most intimate street corner, forcing wounded men to hunt their fellow citizens in order to stay alive."
"What looked like independence in Belarus's case was dependency in disguise — a de facto Russian outpost across its military, political, economic, and cultural life."